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Who	Owns	The	Republic?
As	popular	protests	rage	across	India,	has	Prime	Minister	Narendra	Modi	diverted	his	focus	and	energies	away
from	the	real	issue	facing	​India—the	fragile	state	of	the	economy	that	can	no	longer	be	kept	hidden,	asks	Ravinder
Kaur	(University	of	Copenhagen).
As	popular	protests	against	CAA/NRC	continue	to	rage	across	university	campuses	and	streetcorners,	a	consensus
is	gaining	ground	that	Prime	Minister	Narendra	Modi	has	veered	away	from	the	seemingly	​optimistic,	future-oriented
agenda	of	economic	growth,	and	instead	turned	the	clock	back	to	aggressive	Hindu	majoritarian	politics.	And	that,
in	doing	so,	he	has	diverted	focus	and	energies	away	from	the	real	issue	facing	​India—the	fragile	state	of	the
economy	that	can	no	longer	be	kept	hidden.	This	view	is	shared	by	many	Modi	supporters	and	critics	alike,	albeit
for	very	different	reasons.	Modi	​supporters	on	the	centre-right	lament	that	the	increased	focus	on	Hindu	majoritarian
politics—from	Article	370	and	Ayodhya	to	the	relentless	obsession	with	the	​taxonomy	of	citizens,	doubtful	citizens
and	infiltrators—risks	​derailing	India’s	march	to	the	high	table	of	global	politics.	In	​contrast,	the	critics	view	the
aggressive	turn	to	Hindutva	itself	as	a	diversionary	tactic,	a	calculated	move	to	cover	up	dismal	growth	numbers
that	continue	to	slide	backward	to	the	pre-reform	years.
What	is	striking	in	these	conversations	is	how	Hindutva	2.0	is	often	explained	away	as	something	separate:	a	risk-
laden	instrument	activated	after	Modi’s	trumpcard—the	promise	of	acche	din	(good	days)—failed	to	materialise.
The	arrival	of	Hindutva	on	the	centrestage,	in	this	view,	is	a	form	of	compensation	for	poor	performance	on	the
economic	front.	This	diagnosis	not	only	falls	short,	it	also	misreads	the	nature	of	kinship	between	Hindutva	politics
and	the	economic	growth	agenda.
It	is	by	laying	bare	this	kinship	that	we	can	make	sense	of	the	ongoing	political	struggle,	a	struggle	to	safeguard	not
just	the	spirit	of	the	republic,	but	also	the	right	to	be	counted	as	a	part	of	its	public.
We	can	begin	by	asking	an	altogether	different	set	of	questions:	what	if	the	unabashed	return	of	Hindutva	to	the
forefront	of	Indian	politics	is	neither	an	afterthought	nor	a	hastily	procured	Band-Aid	to	hide	the	botched	operations
on	India’s	economy?	What	if	the	economy	had	not	faltered,	and	was	instead	growing	at	a	dreamlike	double-digit
pace;	and	the	$5	trillion	economy	was	already	a	reality,	not	a	mere	wishful	dream?	Would	Hindutva	politics	then
remain	off-field,	a	reserve	player-in-waiting	on	the	sidelines,	constrained	and	disciplined	by	a	booming	economy?
To	ask	all	this	is	to	first	acknowledge	the	possibility	that	Hindutva	might	be	the	“real	issue”	after	all,	and	that	the
economy	has	always	been	the	means	to	reach	that	end.	To	think	through	these	questions	requires	that	we	pay
attention	to	the	close	interactions	between	the	seemingly	distinct	compartments	of	“liberal”	economy	and	“illiberal”
hyper-nationalism	that	work	together	to	manufacture	Hindutva’s	vision.	All	too	often,	economics	and	politics	are
taken	as	contrasting	entities	packed	in	separate	containers.	Consider	how	the	domain	of	economy	is	mostly
perceived	as	an	uplifting	future-oriented	enterprise	dominated	by	smart	technocrats,	and	in	contrast,	the	domain	of
cultural	politics	signals	chaos,	a	return	to	the	pre-modern	past,	the	stoking	of	communal	passions?
This	persistent	myth	of	separation	between	economy	and	politics	makes	it	difficult	to	see	what	Hindutva	warriors
could	possibly	have	in	​common	with	smooth-talking	technocrats	who	routinely	hold	forth	on	futuristic	themes	like	AI
and	the	fourth	industrial	revolution.
Yet,	it	is	precisely	upon	these	unlikely	entanglements	between	the	capitalist	growth	agenda	and	politics	that	the
aggressive	expansion	of	Hindutva	2.0	consolidated	its	constituency.	To	be	sure,	the	form	of	Hindutva	we	are	​-
witnessing	is	neither	a	replication	of	the	1980s,	nor	one	solely	authored	by	the	RSS.	The	modern	scaffolding	of
Hindutva	2.0	has	been	erected	in	the	three	decades	of	reforms,	aided	and	abetted	by	domestic	and	foreign	capital
through	investment	flows,	and	the	global	recognition	and	political	legitimacy	that	come	with	it.
The	point	is	not	that	there	are	no	tensions	within	Hindutva	on	the	question	of	economy	(the	swadeshi	pitch	still
occasionally	shows	signs	of	life),	but	it	has	internalised	the	logic	of	“opening	up”	markets	as	a	political	strategy.
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“Opening	up”	is	shorthand	for	a	curious	transaction	between	economics	and	politics:	it	denotes	the	ongoing
transformation	of	the	nation-state	itself	into	an	investment	destination.	In	the	1990s,	India	embraced	this	script,
even	if	hesitatingly,	when	it	implemented	a	range	of	structural	adjustment	programs	dubbed	“LPG”—liberalisation,
privatisation,	globalisation—to	boost	growth.	Central	to	this	shift	were	efforts	to	turn	the	nation	itself	into	an	income-
generating	asset,	a	commercial	enclosure	of	capital	and	endless	economic	growth.	This	required	re-imagination
and	re-engineering	of	the	national	identity	into	a	competitive	global	brand;	the	national	territory	into	an
infrastructure-ready	enclosure	for	capital	investment,	and	its	population	as	“demographic	dividend”	that	would	both
produce	and	consume	to	sustain	growth.	In	my	forthcoming	book,	this	reconfiguration	of	the	nation-state	into	an
enclosed	commercial-cultural	zone	is	what	I	call	the	brand	new	nation:	the	nation	revitalised	and	renewed	as	a
profitable	business	enterprise	in	the	global	economy.	Yet	what	seems	like	a	purely	economic	phenomenon	at	first
blush,	in	fact,	is	a	deep-seated	entanglement	between	the	promise	of	capitalist	growth	and	cultural	politics.
Critical	in	this	process	is	the	extra-economic	work	of	capital	flows	and	infrastructure	investments.	These	are	often
thought	to	be	means	for	material	progress	and	development,	but	they	do	more	than	that.	In	the	popular	domain,
capital	flows	are	held	as	a	sign	of	nation’s	esteem	in	the	world,	of	being	desired	by	the	world’s	elite.	What	drives	the
relentless	demand	for	investments	is	not	just	the	nationalist	dream	of	getting	ahead	in	the	world,	but	also	the	fear	of
being	stopped,	of	being	permanently	left	behind	by	global	capital.	The	infusion	of	capital	here	is	not	only	a	magical
moment	that	promises	progress	and	prosperity,	but	a	sign	of	the	arrival	of	the	nation	on	the	world	stage.	Capital
appears	as	a	cur​ative	force	that	can	not	only	efface	the	shame	of	colonial	subjugation	and	violence,	but	also
redeem	the	nation’s	lost	glory	via	economic	growth.
This	emotional	work	of	capital	is	what	Modi	has	deployed	to	expand	the	BJP’s	footprint	beyond	its	traditional
constituency.	The	formula	is	simple:	to	open	territories	to	investors	who	promise	to	infuse	capital	and	usher
development,	and	in	turn	gain	a	kind	of	dual	legitimacy.	Political	as	well	as	managerial,	so	to	speak.	Note	that	the
mere	promise	to	invest	(long	before	any	actual	inv​estment)	yields	quick	results—leaders	who	say	they	“mean
business”	are	cast	as	efficient	managers	of	capital	flow.	This	dual	legitimacy	is	crucial	if	the	plan	is	to	undertake
“bold”	measures	like	demonetisation,	or	bifurcating	regions	and	redrawing	borders.	Thus,	the	formula	of	“investment
summits”	is	a	staple	in	the	war	chest	of	Hindutva	2.0	politics,	a	building	block	with	which	to	create	the	contours	of
Bharat.
Many	incarnations	of	India-as-an-investment-destination	have	been	sold	to	the	public	over	three	decades:	India
Story,	Incredible	India,	India	Shining,	Brand	India,	New	India,	Make	in	India.	Each	of	these	popular	​incarnations	has
long-packaged	enchanting	capitalist	dreamworlds	of	prosperity,	along	with	calls	for	a	strong	leader	to	implement	it.
This	is	where	‘Brand	Modi’	enters	the	script.	The	informal	addition	of	the	prefix	brand	is	not	only	an
acknowledgment	of	Modi’s	pro-capital	credentials,	but	also	a	reference	to	his	personal	brand	identity	as	the	Hindu
nationalist	strongman	loved	by	capital.	The	main	pillar	of	Brand	Modi	is	his	carefully	nurtured	‘muscular’	image—the
one	who	“gets	things	done”	and	doesn’t	flinch	in	the	face	of	opposition.	If	this	strongman	image	helped	attract
capital,	the	economic	muscle	thus	acquired	was	ploughed	back	into	the	political	landscape.	In	short,	the	power	to
capitalise	the	nation	can	also	be	converted	to	the	power	to	own	and	recraft	the	nation	in	one’s	own	image,	the
image	one	wants	the	world	to	see.
With	politics	and	economy	thus	locked	in	embrace,	it	became	possible	to	leverage	economic	gains	to	refashion
India	in	the	cultural	image	Hindutva	ideologues	have	longed	for.	Instructive	in	this	process	is	the	expression	“long-
due	correction”	that	right-wing	commentators	​frequently	deploy	to	explain	policies	on	Kashmir,	Ayodhya	or
citizenship	laws.	To	correct	is	to	improve,	alter	and	right	the	wrongs	that	may	have	occurred	in	the	past.	In	this
case,	India’s	past	becomes	an	inexhaustible	reserve	of	wrongs	that	need	to	be	righted,	and	its	present	the	site	of
correction.	India’s	economic	potential	was	the	fuel	that	could	be	capitalised	to	undertake	major	and	minor	projects
of	corrections.
How	does	the	economic	slowdown	affect	this	politics	of	corrections?	To	be	sure,	the	government	seems	to	be	on	a
backfoot.	Relentless	bad	news	on	the	economic	front	not	only	means	it	has	lost	its	bragging	rights,	but	also	cast	a
dark	shadow	over	Brand	Modi’s	claim	to	be	an	efficient	manager	of	capital.	This	crash	scenario	was	surely	not	part
of	the	Hindutva	2.0	script	that	had	strengthened	its	constituency	by	capitalising	the	economic	gains	made	by	the
Manmohan	Singh	government.	The	script	of	“long-due	corrections”,	however,	won’t	be	abandoned,	only	deferred.
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Meanwhile,	protestors	are	not	only	contesting	CAA/NRC	vigorously,	they	are	doing	so	by	taking	ownership	of	the
republic.	It	is	not	a	proprietary	claim,	but	an	​assumption	of	responsibility	as	keepers	of	the	modern	republic.	India’s
Constitution	has	emerged	as	a	key	symbol	of	resistance	as	well	as	shared	belonging	in	this	battle.	The	exercise	of
power	has	been	met	by	an	assertion	of	the	right	to	belong	to	the	republic,	and	be	counted	as	part	of	its	public.
Instead	of	running	out	of	steam,	the	protests	continue	to	proliferate.
This	article	was	first	published	on	27	Janurary,	2020	at	The	Outlook.		
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.		Image	credit:	Market,	Pune,	India;	Atharva	Tulsi,	Unsplash.
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